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THE SCENIC RIVER ACTS

Robert E. Marsh, Jr.

I.

Introduction

The Nation's free-flowing rivers and scenic watercourses
are in jeopardy. Natural waterfront landscape constantly
falls under the developer's bulldozer for the purposes of
The gradual
power, industry, housing and recreation. 1
disappearance of natural scenic river areas makes it apparent
that a program of preservation is necessary. Concerned by
this necessity, Justice William 0. Douglas in A Wilderness
Bill of Rights (1965) wrote:
We need a new legal framework within which to manage
and preserve free-flowing rivers. The two main
categories to which we are accustomed are national
forests and national parks. But they do not fit
the precise requirements of a sanctuary built around
a free-flowing river. Such a sanctuary ideally is a
long narrow corridor which roads reach but do not
penetrate.
For the purpose of the corridor is
merely to protect the river from civilization.
(p. 143)
Efforts to effectuate such a "legal framework" securing
scenic "corridors" are embodied in the scenic river acts
designed to regulate and control development of land
adjacent to rivers and watercourses. This recent legislative activity is unique because of its preoccupation
with aesthetics and scenic landscape. Four legislative
enactments will be analyzed in light of the common law's
historic disapproval of aesthetic considerations in land
use regulation.

II.

A Synopsis of Aesthetics and the. Law

Nuisance
In common law, the general rule was that there were no
private or public remedies to be found for unsightly conditions. Nuisance law was one of the earliest methods of
regulating private land use. However, the remedies contained
in the law of nuisance would only be granted when there
was judicial determination of a substantial interference with
the particular interest involved. 2 Historically, the interests to be protected were based upon economic or perCourts were reluctant to
sonal security considerations. 3
find that an ugly use of land was a substantial interference with any interest. The philosophy was that the law
should not trouble itself with the petty annoyances resulting from an industrialized way of life.'
Victor Zey v. Town of Long Beach is an example of a judicial

denial of a reguest to restrict a distastefal use of land
as a nuisance.
There, the plaintiff sought to enjoin
construction of the city's "comfort station" adjacent to
his property. The court followed the traditional line of
legal thought, stating that although the aesthetic sense
is offended by the comfort station, such an interference
is not a nuisance justifying relief. Even though dicta
in other cases suggests the need for a private and public
aesthetic nuisance remedy, 6 the common law concepts of
nuisance conventionally exclude aesthetic considerations
in the regulation of another's use of property.
Police Power
The legislative enactments dealing with land use before
zoning came of age adopted the principles of common law
nuisance. 7 Accordingly, the courts extended the common law
disregard of the sensitivity to beauty when dealing with
public regulation of land use.
Recent authors point out
that the judicial position, when construing land use
legislation, was "that which is not a nuisance cannot be
made one by legislative fiat." 8
The courts eventually departed from the common law nuisance
framework and began to rely u2on general welfare concepts
of the police power doctrine.J With Euclid v. Ambler I 0
came the judicial acceptance of police power zoning of
inconsistent land uses. However, even after zoning and
public welfare concepts were recognized, the courts continued
to analyze land use legislation in a manner closely analogous to the judicial analysis of nuisance law. 1 1
That is,
those objectives or interests which would be promoted
through nuisance law would be promoted through public
land regulation. Therefore, when a community would
attempt to use its police power to accomplish purely
aesthetic objectives, the traditional action taken by
the courts was to strike down the community's effort. 1 2
The principle difficulty encountered by the courts was
reconciling interests in beauty with "general welfare"
concepts of police power in the regulation of private land
use.
It was stated by an Ohio court that:
We are remitted to the proposition that the police
power is based upon public necessity and that the
public health, morals, or safety, and not merely
aesthetic interests must be- in danger in order to
justify its use.
There must be an essential
public need for the exercise of the power in order
to justify its use. This is the reason why mere
aesthetic considerations cannot justify the use
of the police power. 1 3
Also grappling with this difficulty, the New York Court
of Appeals stated:
Public welfare is a concept which in recent years
has been widened to include many matters which in
other terms regarded as outside the limits of
government concern. As yet, at least, no judicial

definition has been formulated which is wide enough
to include purely aesthetic considerations.14
Even though there are conceptual problems posed by the
application of the general welfare doctrine to interests
involving natural beauty, in the years following Euclid
there has been a cautious judicial recognition of aesthetic
The majority of courts will now
considerations in zoning.
support incidental scenic interests when other valid general
15
welfare objectives are met with the ordinance or statute.
Nevertheless, despite this changing judicial attitude, the
traditional reluctance to base the exercise of the police
power solely on beautification continues to exist in most
jurisdictions.
There is a minority of courts which will sustain beauty
as the predominate purpose of the exercise of the police
power. The Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), is often cited as the leading authority
for this proposition. 1 6 The Court's dicta in that case
emphasized that the concept of general welfare in police
power regulation was "broad and conclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthful." 1 7 The concept is that
natural scenery or beauty is a valid public interest
justifying legislation solely for that purpose.
Recent judicial decisions demonstrate that the number of
8
courts supporting the minority position is growing.l
1 9
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Stover,
stated that "once it is conceded that aesthetics is a
valid subject of legislative concern, the conclusion
seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed
to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise
Thus, the law is changing with
of the police power."
society's attitudes toward the appearance of its environment. There is a greater awareness of the need to implement the police power to preserve those areas which are
visually pleasing.

Eminent Domain
In contrast to the application of the police power, the
courts traditionally have been less reluctant to allow
public "takings" for improvement of the community's
surroundings. The courts have recognized, in the area
of eminent domain at least, that the community's
interest in its beauty and appearance is a legitimate end
of government. 2 0 The reason for this disparity in judicial
treatment of police power and eminent domain is not readily
apparent. Possibly the courts may feel that the local
bodies promulgating zoning ordinances do not represent
the will of the entire community in such matters. The more
likely rationale is that the courts feel that if
the community wants it bad enough, it can have such
regulation of land use as long as it pays for it.
The Supreme Court's decision in Berman is relied upon
by most courts as extending the exercise of government's

power to the public taking of private land for "uses" and
Reflecting
"purposes" which are essentially scenic. 2 1
this majority view, Wisconsin, an early pioneer of the
"scenic easement," readily accepted picturesque considerations in the "public use" or "purpose" doctrine
of eminent domain. In upholding the constitutionality
of the "taking" of scenic easements along the State's
highways facing the Mississippi River, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin stated:
"The enjoyment of the scenic beauty
by the public which passes along the highway seems to us
to be a direct use by the public of the rights in land which
22
have been taken in the form of a scenic easement."
Therefore, Wisconsin's acquisition of land rights for
mere visual considerations was held to be a valid public
use and purpose for an eminent domain taking. Due to the
increasing legislative 2 3 and judicial 2 4 acceptance of the
preservation of scenic beauty as a "public purpose" or
"use" justifying the power of eminent domain, it is very
likely that any future efforts to "take" or greatly regulate private land for aesthetic reasons will be permitted.
III.

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968

Demonstrating the national concern for the preservation
of natural and scenic landscape, Congress passed the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. section 1271
et seq. (1968), which established the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers System. In section 1271, the Congress
declared its policy as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States that certain selected rivers of the Nation
which, with their immediate environments, possess
outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreationsl,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or
other similar values, shall be preserved in freeflowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit
and enjoyment of present and future generations.
A river could be included in this Congressional scheme
solely on the basis of its aesthetic or scenic characteristics.
This is stressed in section 1273(b):
"A wild,
scenic or recreational river area eligible to be included
in the system is a free-flowing stream

.

.

. that possesses

one or more of the values referred to in the section 1271
of this title."
The Act recognizes and classifies three types of rivers
for the national system:
wild river areas (inaccessible
and primitive); scenic river areas (undeveloped); and
recreational (accessible and developed).25
Additions
to the river system are either by Congressional action
based on study, or through the Secretary of the Interior's
approval of a state request for a river's admission to
the national system. 2 6 Further, when a state requests it,
a joint state-federal study of a river corridor and its
27
environment for inclusion in the system must be made.
The acquisition and management of the lands adjacent to
a designated river is controlled by section 6 of the Act.

The government is authorized by the Act to take fee simple
title or scenic easements in the land adjacent to those
rivers designated. 2 8 As noted in the discussion concerning
eminent domain and taking for beautification purposes, the
effectiveness of these sections which authorize the acquisition of land rights will probably not be hindered by
the courts. However, there are significant portions of
the Act which must be considered in light of the historic
disapproval of visually pleasing interests in land use
regulation.
Though the Act provides for extensive condemnation power,
such power is restricted when the land adjacent to designated rivers is within the limits of a municipality. In
such a case, the power of eminent domain may only be
applied when that municipality has a "valid" zoning
29
ordinance which conforms to the purpose of the Act.
Unfortunately, this critical portion of the Statute is
vague. Possibly Congress intends that if a municipality
can not enact a valid ordinance exercising the police
power for aesthetic purposes, the federal government may
then condemn. Although the Act does not expressly
authorize the condemnation of land within a municipality
having no conforming ordinances, some authorities support
that proposition as the actual Congressional intent for this
portion of the Statute in question. 3 0
If that interpretation is correct, then the United States government
may secure, by condemnation, land adjacent to designated
rivers despite the reluctance or inability of municipalities
to enact conforming zoning ordinances. However, since
the Act does not expressly permit it, some courts may
refuse to allow the government to condemn land adjacent to
designated watercourses within limits of a municipality.
If this is the case, the general intent of the Act, that
is, to preserve entire rivers and their immediate environments, may be frustrated by municipalities within those
jurisdictions which preclude zoning for scenic purposes.
Though no courts have had the opportunity to consider this
aspect of the Act, it is conceivable that the traditional
disapproval of aesthetic considerations in land regulation
may hinder the effectiveness of this federal enactment.
IV.

State Scenic River Enactments

Michigan
Michigan was one of the first states to establish a system
of wild, scenic and recreational rivers through its
Natural River Act of 1970.31 The Natural Resources
Commission is authorized to administer and designate natural
rivers within the State:
The Commission may designate a river as a natural
river area for the purpose of preserving and enhancing
its values for water conservation, its free flowing
condition and its fish, wildlife, boating, scenic,
aesthetic, flood plain, ecologic, historic and
recreational values and uses.32
The law qualifies a river for its system if it possesses
"1 or more of the natural or outstanding existing values"

3
Thus,
listed above. 3
with natural rivers, a
Michigan Natural River
scenic characteristics

like the Federal Statute dealing
river may be designated for the
System due to its aesthetic and
alone.

The Michigan Act allows the Commission to acquire lands
and interests in lands adjacent to the designated watercourses providing the Commission has the consent of the
Therefore, the Act does not contemplate the
owner. 3 4
exercise of eminent domain to effectuate its purposes.
However, the Act does allow the Commission to promulgate
zoning ordinances restricting land use on the lands adjacent
35
This zoning power is authorized
to the selected rivers.
to be exercised over adjacent lands in incorporated and
By this power, the State fully
unincorporated areas. 3 6
intends to preempt the municipal ability to exercise the
police power within local boundaries. This again raises
the problem of whether zoning ordinances based on pastoral
considerations can or will be upheld.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Wolverine Sign Works v.
Bloomfield Hills, 3 7 supported the view that aesthetics
can only be an incidental factor in the exercise of the
police power. Recent Michigan cases show that the courts
still stand by this traditional view as Michigan does not
permit scenic beauty to be a moving factor in the exercise
Therefore, if the Commission desigof the police power. 3 8
nates a river for inclusion in the natural river system
solely on the basis of its scenic values, courts may be
compelled to strike down any ensuing zoning ordinances
restricting land use for such purposes.
Although the Michigan Act does not contemplate the exercise of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings should
not be completely ruled out. The Act allows a component
of its river system to become a part of the National Wild
and Scenic River System under the Federal Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act. 3 9 As mentioned above, the Federal System does
allow condemnation of lands adjacent to designated rivers.
However, as also noted above, the courts have had no
difficulty in accepting the exercise of eminent domain for
aesthetic purposes.

Iowa
Iowa, as another state which has enacted a scenic rivers
act, authorizes the State Conservation Commission to designate any river environment to its scenic river system
which possesses "outstanding water conservation, scenic,
fish, wildlife, historic, or recreational values."'4 0 The
Act also provides that the river area need only possess
one of the above values to be designated and administered
Thus, as
as a component of the scenic river system. 4 1
with the Michigan and Federal scenic river acts, Iowa's
Statute would permit designation solely on the basis of
the river's aesthetic value.
The Statute does not expressly authorize the exercise of
eminent domain to meet the purposes of the enactment.
However, as with the Michigan Statute, eminent domain may
be possible since the Act does include a provision allowing

parts of the State's Scenic River System to be included
in the National Wild and Scenic River System. 4 2 Also, the
Act in authorizing the State Commission to "preserve and
manage''4 3 designated areas may imply the power of condemnation. This aspect of the Statute, however, has not
been construed by the courts of Iowa.
The Act also does not empower the State Commission to zone
and restrict land use of the lands adjacent to included
rivercourses.
Rather, it allows the Commission to encourage
and aid political sub-divisions to enact zoning ordinances
and other controls to preserve the values of the designated
rivers. 4 4 Thus, the power and the authority to restrict
land use adjacent to selected rivers is delegated to local
governmental units and the overall effectiveness of the Act
seems to lose much due to this lack of state-wide control.
Iowa goes along with the traditional view that aesthetic
considerations in the exercise of the police power for zoning
purposes are merely auxiliary; and that a zoning ordinance
will only be sustained on the basis of a valid relation to
the health, safety and general welfare of a community. 4 5
With the passage of the Scenic Rivers Act, and the inclusion
of a river for mere aesthetic values, the recent Statute
and past Iowa case law are in direct conflict. The decisional
law has not kept abreast of the Iowa Legislature's
recognition of the value and importance of restricting land
use for scenic purposes.

Tennessee
Tennessee enacted the earliest state natural river act with
the Tennessee Scenic River Act of 1968.46
The Act
classifies qualified river environments as natural river
areas; pastoral river areas; and partially developed river
areas. 4 7
The Commissioner of Conservation studies and
proposes additions to the State River System, 4 8 as well as
administering and managing those areas designated for the
System. 4 9
In its administration of these areas, the
Commission is to consider the "esthetic, scenic, historic,
archaeologic, and scientific features of the area."'5 0
The Act allows the Commissioner to acquire land adjacent
to selected areas by outright purchase in fee title or to
acquire interests in land such as scenic easements. 5l
Such land interests may also be "taken" by the Commissioner
by exercising the power of eminent domain. 5 2 The
Commissioner is not empowered to enact zoning ordinances
restricting the land uses of the land within the designated
river areas. However, the Statute specifically restricts
the land uses permitted within the limits of the classified scenic river areas. 5 3
In effect, the Act is a statewide zoning ordinance restricting land use in all of those
areas selected to be a component of the Scenic River System.
As with the other state and federal scenic river acts, the
Tennessee enactment is ahead of decisional law in allowing
land use restrictions for aesthetic purposes.
No courts
have construed the Tennessee Scenic River Act, however,
the Tennessee courts traditionally have not permitted scenic
considerations alone to justify the exercise of the police
power in land use regulation. 5 4 The new natural river
68

acts are directly incompatible with the long-established
common law principles excluding pastoral considerations in
land use regulation.
V.

Conclusion

The recently enacted scenic river acts are attempts to
manage and preserve scenic, free-flowing rivers. They rely
essentially on regulatory land use devices such as zoning
and scenic easements. Unfortunately there are conceptual
and historical difficulties in authorizing the use of the
police power for express aesthetic purposes. It is conceivable that courts could frustrate the purposes of these
enactments ly refusing to permit such an exercise of the
police power. At this time there have been no cases construing these statutes to resolve these issues. Notwithstanding
the conceptual conflict for many courts, there is a growing
minority of jurisdictions which will permit authorization
of the police power for purposes solely aesthetic.
Free-flowing rivers must be considered natural resources
to be preserved and conserved. The courts should realize
that community needs and attitudes have changed to accept
this view. It should be understood by the courts that scenic
river acts are to save portions of our national heritage
before they are lost to man's encompassing development of
the land.
In this respect such enactments involve more
than mere aesthetics, even though statutory language may
suggest aesthetics as the ultimate and sole consideration.
The courts should look beyond the statutory language.
The scenic river acts should be upheld by the courts despite
any conceptual or historical conflict which may exist.
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